Do Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido e sua heterogeneidade Ontológica

Abstract

This article will reflect on the Free and Informed Consent (IC), its origin, its essence, its necessity and the ontological disharmony related to its concept. We will start from the philosophical analysis of the physician and philosopher Diego Gracia who, with his ideas erected and supported by other thinkers mentioned here, suggests that the IC, as the greatest representative of the new liberal bioethical model, has serious limitations. In the quest to support this, we will make use of the ontological speculation launched by the philosopher Wittgenstein, using this as a tool to demonstrate the ontological non-unity of the IC, despite having it, conceptually, as a being, entity or universal concept. Thus, we will try to justify that the application of the IC in most clinical situations, in addition to compromising the virtuous and fiduciary relationship that should arise between the health professional and the patient, will normally be idle. Obviously, only the research conditions to be carried out in human beings are highlighted here.